




Estimating preferences for modes of drug administration: The case of 
US healthcare professionals 
Ebenezer K. Tetteh*, Steve Morris, Nigel  Titchener-Hooker 
University College London, UK 
 
 
There are hidden drug administration costs that arise from a mismatch between end-user preferences and how manufacturers choose to formulate their 
drug products for delivery to patients. The corollary of this is: there are “intangible beneﬁts” from considering end-user preferences in manufacturing 
patient-friendly medicines. It is important then to have some idea of what pharmaceu- tical manufacturers should consider in making patient-friendly 
medicines and of the magnitude of the indirect beneﬁts from doing so. 
Objectives: This study aimed to evaluate preferences of healthcare professionals in the US for the non- monetary attributes of different modes of drug 
administration. It uses these preference orderings to compute a monetary valuation of the indirect beneﬁts from making patient-friendly medicines. 
Methods: A survey collected choice preferences of a sample of 210 healthcare professionals in the US for two unlabelled drug options. These drugs were 
identical except in the levels of attributes of drug administration. Using the choice data collected, statistical models were estimated to compute gross 
welfare beneﬁts, measured by the expected compensating variation, from making drugs in a more patient-friendly manner. 
Results: The monetary value of end-user beneﬁts from developing patient-friendly drug delivery systems is: (1) as large as the annual acquisition costs per 
full treatment episode for some biologic drugs; and (2) likely to fall in the “high end” of the distribution of the direct monetary costs of drug 
administration. Conclusions:  An examination of end-user preferences should help manufacturers make more effective and efﬁcient use of limited 





Different types of resources (pre-treatment counselling and 
medications; patient education and training for self-  administration; 
medical equipment and consumables; laboratory tests, post-
treatment progress checks etc.) are consumed each time a drug is 
administered. Depending on the type of drug and the disease 
condition in question, administration of multiple  drug  doses over 
time could be a “silent” driver of the direct monetary 
costs  of  healthcare  delivery.1   Granted,  a  given  mode  of      drug 
administration that incurs the lowest monetary cost to healthcare 
payers or providers may incur hidden indirect  costs in terms  of    a 
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mismatch with what is preferred by end-users2 e the end-user 
here being patients or healthcare professionals acting on behalf of 
patients. Using modes of drug delivery that are out of tune with 
end-user preferences is thus associated with “intangible costs” that 
must be accounted for when pharmaceutical manufacturers decide 
on which production plans to use or research when making 
clinically-beneﬁcial medicines. The argument here is: if the mode 
of drug administration is simply a vehicle by which the (incre- 
mental) health beneﬁts provided by a drug are delivered to pa- 
tients, then pharmaceutical manufacturers need to have some 
knowledge of end-user preferences for this vehicle if they are to 
produce patient-friendly medicines. 
But if patient-friendly medicines are no more than drug 
products differentiated according to the mode of administration 
most preferred by end-users, then the obvious question is:  whose 
preferences should be evaluated and taken into account when 





characteristics  theory,5,6  or  the  “abstract  product approach”,7 
j¼1 
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consider that pharmaceutical R&D expenditures on medicines 
(including the costs of manufacturing research) for diseases that  are 
common to both high- and low-income countries are  joint  global  
costs  to  be  recouped  from  all  end-users  in  all  countries 
(submarkets) where a given drug is consumed.3 This joint global 
nature of pharmaceutical R&D means,  in theory,  the  preferences 
of all end-users worldwide should be considered, or, at least, end-
users in healthcare systems that a manufacturer trades with. Given 
pharmaceutical R&D for global diseases is driven largely by 
economic demand in OECD countries; and the time  and  re-  sources 
available for this study, we only elicit the preferences of healthcare 
professionals (doctors and nurses) acting on behalf of patients in the 
US. We focus on healthcare professionals as they  are often 
responsible for making  resource  allocation  and  spending decisions; 
and because the ultimate end-users  (pa-  tients) are usually less-
informed, sometimes passive recipients of medical care. 
In this paper, we evaluate healthcare professionals' preferences 
for the non-monetary characteristics (attributes) of modes of drug 
administration using a discrete choice experiment (DCE). Our 
application of a DCE is in accordance with the literature on product 
variety, notably Spence's4 arguments that the most natural way   of 
evaluating the welfare effects of product differentiation is in 
“attribute space”. That is, if end-user preferences for a common set 
of attributes of a class of products or services is known for a 
consuming population, then the (expected) demand for or gross 
consumer welfare beneﬁts gained from any set of products or ser- 
vices that can be described by combinations of these attributes can 
be estimated. In contrast to working in “attribute space”, conven- 
tional welfare analysis in “product space”, i.e., evaluating demands 
for products as a whole  and not as a combination of attributes, do  not 
allow estimation of demands for hypothetical, non-existent or 
potential products or  services. 
 
2. Discrete choices and logit  demands 
 
prevailing prices of drug products and depending on the resources 
available to a healthcare professional, i.e., the residual income or 
ﬁnancing available after expenditure on a composite of all other 
healthcare goods and services, one can identify what is called an 
“attributes efﬁciency frontier” that indicates the maximum possible 
combination of attributes and attribute-levels (collection of drug 
products) that can be  afforded. 
This, however, assumes that production possibilities allow 
manufacturers to supply all drug products that all healthcare pro- 
fessionals want or prefer. In the case of limited production possi- 
bilities (dictated in part by the state of the underlying manufacturing 
science), some healthcare professionals may not get what they want 
or prefer, that is, the product (combination of at- tributes or attribute 
levels) that maximizes their utility. As a compromise, some 
healthcare professionals  may  choose  to consume at different times 
different products for which a combi- nation of proﬁles of selected 
products matches their best preferred product if it was supplied by 
manufacturers. What is clear here is: given limited resources 
available to manufacturers, and the need to minimize end-user 
welfare losses, it is crucial that manufacturers have some knowledge 
of the distribution of healthcare pro- fessionals' preferences in order 
for them to supply the classes of drug products (differentiated by 
their mode of administration) that matches closely what the average 
representative professional rec- ommends  or  consumes. 
Following random utility theory,8 the ‘satisfaction’, ‘beneﬁts’ or 
utility (U* ) a healthcare professional, s, derives from choosing 
alternative product j from among a set of J differentiated products 
(which in this case refers to J modes of drug administration) is  made 
of up of two parts. One, a systematic, explainable or observable 
component, Vsj that is a function of the set of attributes; and two, a 
random unexplained error term, εsj. We can thus write the following 
utility function that is linear in parameters and linear in attribute 
levels: 
 
Proposed here is a simpliﬁed healthcare market made up of a 
ﬁnite number of pharmaceutical manufacturers on the supply-side 
and a ﬁnite number of end-users: healthcare professionals, acting 













manufacturer supplies drug products that are identical except for 
being differentiated according to their mode of administration to 
patients. 
The decision to supply such differentiated drug products is 
subject to: (1) the resources available for production; (2) the state   of 
underlying manufacturing science; (3) each manufacturer's 
expectation of incremental private producer surplus from doing so, 
i.e., the additional revenues net of any additional manufacturing 
costs; and (4) whether the expected producer surplus covers any 
additional ﬁxed costs or sunk expenditures on R&D. The decision to 
consume these differentiated products is in effect an expression of 
preferences  for  a  given  mode  of  drug  administration.  Following 
0           0 
k   k 
j¼1 
 
where Xjk is a vector of attribute-levels  decomposed  into  X
0  
, a 
vector of generic non-monetary attribute-levels and Cp, the drug 
administration cost associated with each alternative product. bjk is a 
vector of attribute-coefﬁcients, decomposed into b
0 
, a vector of 
coefﬁcients for the non-monetary attributes and bp, coefﬁcient for 
the cost attribute. The random error term (εsj) refers to the inﬂu- 
ence of unobserved or unmeasured factors whilst the alternative- 
speciﬁc-constant ASCj captures any peculiar effects of each alter- 





demand-side utility obtained from each differentiated drug prod-  uct 
is derived not from the drug per se but indirectly from the he- donic 
characteristics (attributes) of drug administration embodied by that 
drug. 
In this market, demand for a drug product (which is in effect 
demand for modes of drug administration) can be considered as a 
derived demand for a bundle of attributes of drug administration. 
Each drug product can be deﬁned by various possible combinations 
of attributes and levels (values) for these attributes. These “treat- 
ment combinations” of attributes and attribute-levels (or proﬁles of 
the products) can be thought of as the output of a transformation 
matrix that turns attributes into products, and vice versa. Given the 
 
Because each drug product is identical except in the mode of 
administration, the choice of each healthcare professional is 
essentially a discrete one. They either chose to have the drug or not: 
there is no question of how many or how much. Preferences for 
differentiated drug products can therefore be equivalently  described 
by a distribution of choice probabilities for different modes of  drug 
administration. 
Conditional on knowing the vector bjk, the probability (P) that 
j(   1) will be chosen by a given healthcare professional above the 
other J e 1 discrete products, in each choice situation (n), can be 
estimated  using  the “mother” multinomial  logit  (MNL) model9  as 
follows: 
be considered as the mean of ε .)sj 




m  bjk Xjk 
¼ ¼ 
 






X1k Þ i\ (2) 
review above with interviews and/or focus group discussions with 
members of the sample population of interest. Given the time and 
 
 
where y denotes the choices made such that y1   1 if product j(   1) 
is selected and zero otherwise. Note equation (2) relies on a Gumbel 
probability density function for an independent and identically 
distributed (IID) error term, where m is a positive scale parameter 
that is inversely related to the error variance. Since the error terms 
are speciﬁc to each choice dataset, m in the “mother” MNL model is 
usually normalized to one. The normalized IID error terms together 
with ﬁxed preference coefﬁcients yields the so-called indepen-  dence 
from [ir]relevant alternatives (IIA) assumption e which suggests the 
ratio of choice probabilities are independent of the inclusion or 
omission of other   products. 
One could in a survey or some referendum, collect repeated 
preferences for products (proﬁles of attributes and attribute-levels) 
over a sequence of choice situations e so as to maximize the pool of 
information that can be collected from a single healthcare profes- 
sional. The parameters of Equation (2), for the average healthcare 
professional in the survey sample, can be identiﬁed from empirical 




3.1. Survey development 
 
The researchers set out to identify a common set of relevant 
attributes and attribute-levels for different modes of drug admin- 
istration. This was based on a selective review of Benjamin et  al.,10 
Augustovski et al.,11  Huynh et al.,12  Parker and   Davey,13  Dychter 
et al. 14; and two systematic reviews.15,16 Table 1 below shows our 
selected set of attributes, deﬁnitions of these attributes and their 
levels. There are three things to note from Table 1. 
First, one would preferably want to supplement the literature 
or dearth of existing (grey) literature. We therefore make no claim 
here that the selected set of attributes and attribute-levels are 
“exhaustive” of all characteristics of all possible modes of drug 
administration. We believe, however, that the selected attributes and 
attribute-levels in Table 1 are relevant and suited for investi- gating 
the gross welfare beneﬁts from manufacturing patient- friendly 
medicines. Second, the attribute “risk  of  non-compli-  ance” can be 
thought of as a composite measure of how a  given mode of drug 
delivery disrupts patients' daily activities; the inci- dence of adverse 
events speciﬁc to the mode of drug delivery (and separate from that 
of the drug molecule itself) as well as any other factors that might 
negatively affect treatment compliance, for instance, disutility of 
pain at the site of drug administration, time and travel costs of 
accessing healthcare or the absence of insurance cover  for  medical 
expenses. 
Third, in the analyses, the attribute “dosing frequency” was made 
into a continuous variable that describes the number of unit 
administrations of a drug. This was to allow more ﬂexibility in 
estimating the welfare beneﬁts derived from the decisions and 
actions taken by healthcare professionals on behalf of patients. For 
the same reason, the cost attribute was translated into a continuous 
variable, setting an upper limit of $20,000. This is not an arbitrary 
ﬁgure. Our selection of levels for the cost attribute was meant to 
mimic the empirical distribution of drug administration costs re- 
ported elsewhere.17 These cost estimates include proximal resource 
costs incurred before and after physical administration of a drug as 
well as the costs of physically administering a drug through one of 
the body's oriﬁces. They exclude drug acquisition costs and other 
non-drug  costs.  The  maximum  cost  limit  speciﬁed  is  consistent 
with Farroni et al.18 who report that clinical charges for using a 
room  and  administering  azacitidine  in  the  ofﬁce  (i.e.,  a  clinical 
 
Table 1 
Attributes, deﬁnitions and attribute   levels. 
Attributes Deﬁnitions Levels 
Method of drug administration This attribute refers to the route by which therapeutically-active drug products are 
physically administered into a patient. The attribute-levels include “all other needle- 
free” methods of drug administration to capture the preferences of patients who desire 
oral drug delivery and/or have a fear of needles. 
Dosing frequency This attribute refers to the frequency of administering a drug for a single full course of 
treatment. Dosing frequency associated with repeated treatments should not be 
considered. 
 
Setting This attribute refers to place (clinical and non-clinical settings) where a given drug is 
administered. Clinical settings include, for example, hospitals, outpatient clinics, care 
homes, ofﬁces of general practitioners/physicians etc. Non-clinical settings include 
home, schools and other public places. 
Risk of non-compliance This attribute refers to any potential threats to medication compliance or adherence due 
to a given mode or method of drug administration and/or recommended dosing 
regimen. This is separate from non-compliance due to the safety proﬁle of the drug 
molecule. 
Risk of medication errors This attribute refers to the incidence of common errors of drug administration such as 
drug preparation and dosing errors; substitution errors (i.e., giving the wrong drug to 
the wrong patient); violation of sterile conditions when drawing up a drug; cuts in glass 
ampoules and injection of minute shards of glass with the drug etc. 
Cost This attribute refers to the additional resource costs (per patient per full treatment 




1. Intravenous delivery 
2. Subcutaneous delivery 
3. Intramuscular delivery 
4. Needle-free delivery 
1. Once every six months 
2. Once every month 
3. Once every week 
4. Once every day 
1. Clinical 
2. Non-clinical þ self-administration
a
 














4. Over $3000 
a 
This refers to the situation where people, if properly trained, could self-administer the drug in a non-clinical setting; or otherwise, their medications will have to be 
delivered to them under the supervision of qualiﬁed health worker, for example, a community or district nurse. For this set of attributes and attribute-levels, we have a full 




) possible proﬁles or treatment  combinations. 
resources available for this study, we were not able to apply these 







setting) ranges from $300-$500 per injection: charges per patient per  
year  for  a  full  treatment  course  of  six  cycles  ranges   from 
$12,600-$21,000. We believe $20,000 is a reasonable upper limit 
since charges do not always match costs. 
Having identiﬁed the most relevant attributes and attribute- 
levels, the investigators developed an “efﬁciency choice” experi- 
mental designs that form the basis of our DCE survey question- 
naires. The experimental design embodies the transformation 
matrix for turning products into bundles of attributes and bundle of 
attributes into products. For this survey, we decided to present 
participants with the same sequence of choice situations, where in 
each situation a respondent had to choose between two unlabelled 
drugs A and B that are identical in every aspect apart from the 
manner in which they are administered to patient. A forced-choice 
format was employed by not offering a  constant  “none” or  “opt- out” 
alternative. This is because of the difﬁculty in imagining that 
healthcare professionals will deny or withhold a clinically beneﬁ- cial 
drug simply because the way in which the drug is administered is 
not what they or their patients  prefer. 
The investigators developed basic experimental designs, esti- 
mating the main effects of the attribute-levels. This was done in  SAS 
v. 9.319,20, resulting in a 24 choice-set experimental design that had 
a relative D-efﬁciency of 52.24%. This design was chosen based on 
joint considerations of its relative D-efﬁciency and its statistical 
properties when merged with an artiﬁcial pre-pilot dataset created 
with simulated choice data. Compared to other experimental de- 
 
the target sample of US doctors and nurses. It took roughly two 
weeks for the vendor to complete the surveys. Our dataset provided 
5040 usable choice responses from 210 survey respondents. The 
vendor provided no information on number of people they con- 
tacted in order to achieve the minimum number of respondents, 
and for that reason we cannot compute a survey response rate. 
Given that online panels of survey respondents could vary from 
actual populations of interest, it cannot be said that the sample is 
representative of all healthcare professionals in the US. De- 
mographic characteristics of the estimation sample are shown in 
Table 2 below. 
 
3.3.  Statistical modelling 
 
To adequately capture variations in choice data, a number of 
analyses were conducted, starting with the “mother” MNL model, 
i.e., Equation (2). The second model estimated is the hetero- 
skedastic multinomial (HMNL) model, where the scale parameter is 
no longer normalized to one but considered a variable that must be 
estimated. In this case, the error terms are longer IID distributed. 
With the scale parameter expressed as a function of a vector of 
respondents' characteristics (Z), the probability of an individual 
respondent choosing alternative product j from among the set of 





signs,  this  design  yielded  the  lowest  standard  errors  over     all 
 
Pjns yj ¼ 1 ¼ PJ 
( (3) 
 
vestigators considered that a 24-choice-set design might impose 
greater cognitive burden (task complexity) for survey respondents, 
leading perhaps to irrational or inconsistent choices.21 This issue 
was  resolved by blocking this  design into two versions  e   each 
version consisting of 12 randomly assigned choice sets. No prior 
information on attribute effects was used in developing the 
designs. 
 
3.2.  Survey administration 
 
The survey questionnaires, developed from the blocked exper- 
imental designs above, were split into three sections. The ﬁrst section 
of each questionnaire provided a preamble with informa- tion about 
the purpose of the study and the hypothetical “con- structed” context 
in which respondents have to make their choices. It also provided 
descriptions of the attributes and attribute-levels as well as an 
example of a completed choice set as a guide for the survey 
respondents. Respondents were asked to make their choices 
assuming they were “fund holders”, i.e., they had ﬁnancial re- 
sponsibility over the allocation and use of resources for healthcare 
provision. The second section contained the actual sequence of 12 
choice questions or situations. And, the third section collected 
anonymized information on individual  respondents'  characteristics. 
A small-scale informal pilot of the questionnaires with no more 
than ﬁve people was used to test the wording of the questionnaire; to 
ensure that the instructions were clear and to identify what might 
be perceived as implausible combination of attributes and attribute-
levels. We found that it took, on average, 15e20 min to complete each 
block questionnaire. Following the pilot phase, small wording  
changes  to  the  questionnaires  were  made  to    improve 
clarity. In line with recommendations made by the ISPOR Good 
Research Practices for Conjoint Analysis Task Force,22 a sample size 
of survey participants was chosen that exhausted the   resources 
available for this study. With the help of a commercial vendor 
(Survey Monkey), the questionnaires were administered online    to 
where a is a vector of parameters reﬂecting the inﬂuence of re- 
spondents' characteristics on the error variance. If a is not statis- 
tically different from zero, the HMNL model closely    approximates 
 
Table 2 
Demographic characteristics of sample. 
 
 







Female 144 (68.90) 
Respondents' age (208) 
Under 50 years 105 (50.48) 
::50 years 103 (49.52) 
Type of healthcare institution (209) 
Solo medical practice 14 (6.70) 
Government-run 15 (7.18) 
Private-for-proﬁt 67 (32.06) 




Patient case-mix (209) 
Inpatients 78 (37.32) 
Outpatients 80 (38.28) 
Accidents & emergency 22 (10.53) 
Other
a
 29 (13.88) 
US census region (206)  
East  North Central 31 (15.05) 
East  South Central 10 (4.85) 
Middle Atlantic 27 (13.11) 
South Atlantic
a
 38 (18.45) 
Mountain 16 (7.77) 
New England 22 (10.68) 
Paciﬁc 24 (11.65) 
West North Central 20 (9.71) 
West South Central 18 (8.74) 
 
 
Notes: N     number of respondents. 
a 
Indicates the reference category for the effects-coding used (see also 
Table 3). Our dataset offered a complete sequence of 12 choices for each 
of the 210 survey respondents. However, for three respondents, we had 
missing data on some of their characteristics whilst for one respondent 
we had no information on all characteristics. 
attribute-coefﬁcients estimated using the same “mother” MNL 
model  with  the  same  simulated  discrete-choice  data.  The in- 





P * P 
 
the “mother” MNL.21 
  
coefﬁcients are normal or log-normal distributed, independent or 
The third model is the entropy multinomial logit (EMNL) in 
which the scale parameter is a function of entropy (E): a measure of 
the variation represented in the probability distribution of a discrete 
random variable, in this case the choice variable y. In DCE 
literature, entropy summarizes the impact of respondent fatigue. 
The argument is: even if survey respondents are identical, differ- 
correlated. The MMNL model is estimated by drawing individual- 
speciﬁc coefﬁcients from a mixture of continuous parametric dis- 
tributions denoted by f b Ф , where Ф refers to parameters of that 
mixture distribution. Choice probability in a given situation is then 
given by: 
ential amounts of effort exerted in making choices will appear as 
unobserved  heterogeneity  in preferences.  Here we  express the ( \ 1 X
02 expðbsjkXjk
\ 3  1
 
scale parameter as a function of entropy of each choice situation: 















where R is the number of Halton simulations; and bsjk is the rth 




(4) The ﬁfth is a latent-class multinomial logit (LCMNL) model that 
Ens ¼ -  
j¼1 
Pjnslog Pjns assumes preference coefﬁcients are drawn from a mixture of non- 
parametric discrete distributions, representing C  latent  classes   of 
homogenous subpopulations. It is not known a priori which latent 
where Pjns is the estimated choice probability from the  “mother” 
MNL model; q1; q2 are parameters associated with entropy. The 
quadratic function for the scale parameter is intended to    estimate 
non-linearity in unobserved heterogeneity captured by the  mea- 
class an individual belongs to. So unconditional on class member- 
ship, the choice probability (P*) in a given choice situation is esti- 
mated as: 
sure  of  entropy  above.  The  case  of  cq1 < 0  and  cq2 > 0  indicates 
C
* 
2 0  exp 
X 
\ 13 
respondent fatigue, i.e., no learning effects and declining effort as 
23,24 P*   
(




4 expðnc þ gcZsÞ @ 
ðbcjk   jk \A5 
respondents work through a sequence of choice sets. 
The fourth is a mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) model in which 
b varies randomly across individual respondents. In this case, the 













common practice is to assume the individual-speciﬁc   preference 
Table 3 
Explanatory variables. 
Variables Deﬁnitions (Effects coding) 
INTRAVENOUS ¼ 1 if a drug is administered intravenously (1, 0, 0,-1) 
SUBCUTANEOUS ¼ 1 if a drug is administered subcutaneously (0, 1, 0, -1) 
where   the   vector   g ð¼ g1; g2; …; gC Þ    refers   to  the   effect  of 
INTRAMUSCULAR ¼ 1 if a drug is administered intramuscularly (0, 0, 1, -1). The reference category (-1) is administration via needle-free routes 
DOSFREQ This refers to the number of unit administrations for a single full course of treatment over a one year period. The variable allows the attribute- 
levels: “once every day”, “once every week”, “once every month” and “once every six months” to be expressed on a continuous quantitative scale 
NONCLINICAL_SELF ¼ 1 if a drug is self-administered in non-clinical settings (1, 0, -1) 
NONCLINICAL_SUPV ¼ 1 if a drug is administered in non-clinical settings under the supervision of a qualiﬁed healthcare professional, zero otherwise (0, 1, -1). The 
reference category (-1) is drug administration in clinical settings 
NONCOMP_MODERATE  ¼ 1 if the risk of patient non-compliance associated with a given mode of drug administration is moderate (1, 0, -1) 
NONCOMP_SEVERE ¼ 1 if the risk of patient non-compliance associated with a given mode or method of drug administration is severe (0, 1, -1). The reference 
category (-1) is drug delivery that is associated with no risk of non-compliance 
RME_MODERATE ¼ 1 if the risk of medication errors made by health staff or by patients self-administering is moderate (1, 0, -1) 
RME_SEVERE ¼ 1 if the risk of medication errors made by health staff or by patients self-administering is severe (0, 1, -1). The reference category (-1) is drug 
delivery that is associated with no risk of medication errors 
COST This refers to the cost of resources expended on drug administration per patient per single full treatment course over a year. It excludes drug 
acquisition costs 
A Alternative-speciﬁc constant for the drug A option (1, -1). The reference point, drug option B ¼ -1 
FEMALE ¼ 1 if survey respondent is female (1, -1). The reference category (-1) are males 
RESPONDENTAGE Continuous variable indicating the age of a survey respondent 
SOLO ¼ 1 if a respondent works in a solo medical practice (1, 0, 0, 0, -1) 
GOVERNMENT ¼ 1 if a respondent works in a government-run healthcare institution (0, 1, 0, 0, -1) 
PRIVATE-FOR-PROFIT      ¼ 1 if a respondent works in a private-for-proﬁt healthcare institution (0, 0, 1, 0, -1) 
NON-FOR-PROFIT ¼ 1 if a respondent works in a non-for-proﬁt healthcare institution (0, 0, 0, 1, -1). The reference category (-1) are respondents who work in all 
other healthcare institutions not mentioned above 
INPATIENTS ¼ 1 if a respondent caters to inpatients (1, 0, 0, -1) 
OUTPATIENTS ¼ 1 if a respondent caters to out-patients (0, 1, 0, -1) 
EMERGENCY ¼ 1 if a respondent caters to patients in accident and emergency departments (0, 0, 1, -1). The reference category (-1) are respondents who cater 
to all other kinds of   patients 
ENC ¼ 1 if a respondent's healthcare institution is located in the East North Central census region (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1) 
ESC ¼ 1 if a respondent's healthcare institution is located in the East South Central census region (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1) 
MA ¼ 1 if a respondent's healthcare institution is located in the Middle Atlantic census region (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1) 
J 
Mo ¼ 1 if a respondent's healthcare institution is located in the Mountain census region (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1) 
NE ¼ 1 if a respondent's healthcare institution is located in the New England census region (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, -1) 
PA ¼ 1 if a respondent's healthcare institution is located in the Paciﬁc census region (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, -1) 
WNC ¼ 1 if a respondent's healthcare institution is located in the West North Central census region (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, -1) 
WSC ¼ 1 if a respondent's healthcare institution is located in the West South Central census region (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, -1). The reference category 
  (-1) are respondents who work in healthcare institutions located in the South Atlantic census region  
Notes: We control for the location of respondents' healthcare institution to address the possibility that the level and rise in healthcare expenditures (and for that matter 
provider income and resources spent on drug administration) may differ across US census regions. We had no information on variation in provider income at the individual or 
institutional level. 
c¼1  







respondents' characteristics on pc, the probability of  class mem- the nature of the choices observed. 
bership (
PC   pc ¼ 1); and nc is a vector of class-speciﬁc constants. First, note that the coefﬁcients of the HMNL model are  quite 
  
timal 
consistent Akaike  Information criterion  (cAIC) and/or  the   lowest 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Here we determined C* by 
estimating two to ten LCMNL models.26 
The models above were estimated in STATA v. 11 using the 
effects-coded explanatory variables in Table 3 below. Variables in the 
shaded portion of Table 3 are those related to respondents' 
characteristics, i.e., the Z variables in Equation (6). 
 
3.4.   Measuring end-user beneﬁts 
 
As a measure of welfare beneﬁts, the marginal willingness-to- 
pay (MWTP) was calculated for a single non-cost attribute under 
consideration e assuming there is only one product available that 
will be chosen with a 100% certainty. MWTP is ratio of coefﬁcients 
for that attribute to the coefﬁcient for the cost attribute. Classical 
conﬁdence intervals for the MWTP estimates were generated using 
100 bootstrap replicates. That is, a sampling distribution of MWTP 
estimates using 100 bootstrap resamples was created from the 
original dataset. Each bootstrap resample was created by randomly 
drawing individual observations with replacement whilst ensuring 
each resample matches the structure of the original choice data, i.e., 
the individual observations are (1) clustered according to indicators 
for respondents and (2) grouped, within each cluster, according to 
indicators for the choice sets. Of course, a higher number of repli- 
cates is needed for more precise estimation but we prefer this 
procedure as it is: (1) computationally less demanding; (2) uses 
actual data from respondents without making parametric as- 
sumptions about the distribution of MWTP; and (3) compatible 
with all STATA estimators for the HMNL, EMNL, MMNL and LCMNL 
models. 
The expected compensating variation (ECV), which is a more 
valid measure of beneﬁts when there is uncertainty about which 
product will be chosen, was also calculated For discrete-choice 
probabilities estimated using an MNL-type   model: 
1 
2    
X 








for heteroskedasticity indicated statistically insigniﬁcant unob- 
served heterogeneity (p  value    0.1064). This preference certainty  or 
minimal residual unobserved variance appears to be explained  by 
whether US healthcare professionals work in private-for-proﬁt  or 
not-for-proﬁt healthcare institutions, and  whether  they  cater for 
inpatient healthcare demands. It also appears to be explained by 
whether a given healthcare professional works in the Middle- 
Atlantic census region as opposed to the South-Atlantic census 
region (which is the reference   category). 
Second, note the loss of statistical signiﬁcance of the attribute- 
coefﬁcients obtained from the EMNL model. We know from equa- 
tion (4) that the EMNL model estimates a quadratic relationship 
between the scale parameter and a measure of entropy (which 
indicates the degree of randomness or “unlikeliness” of the choice 
dataset). It appears that, in the presence of statistically insigniﬁcant 
unobserved heterogeneity (identiﬁed from the HMNL model), the 
EMNL model fails to identify appreciable entropy within the choice 
data. Consequently, the (unrestricted) EMNL model does not 
signiﬁcantly ﬁt the data better than the (restricted) MNL model. 
The additional explanatory power provided by the EMNL model 
over and above the MNL model is small. What is more the statis- 
tically insigniﬁcant entropy parameters (q1 ; q2 ) mean we cannot 
reject arguments that there are no signiﬁcant respondent-fatigue 
effects. Still the magnitude and signs of the insigniﬁcant entropy 
parameters suggests initial exertion of effort is offset later by an 
equivalent decline in effort. To add, the MNL and HMNL models 
indicate a statistically signiﬁcant alternative-speciﬁc-constant: a 
preference for option B (listed on the right side of each choice set in 
the survey) as opposed to option A (listed on the left). We can 
therefore say respondents switch from full evaluation of the attri- 
butes at the beginning of the DCE questionnaire to decision- 
simplifying heuristics based on partial information towards the 
end. 
Third,  the  improvement  in  log-likelihood  observed  for the 
MMNL model (relative to the MNL model) conﬁrms there are, at 






exp bjkXjk - ln  
j¼1 
exp bjkXjk 5 (7) preference coefﬁcients we speciﬁed ex ante as random. However, 
these variations and correlations in preferences can be equivalently 
captured by the LCMNL model without making parametric   as- 
where l is the marginal utility of income proxied by the negative 
coefﬁcient of the price/cost attribute; and the superscripts 0 and 1 
denote what was available before and after a product switch. ECV 
measures  the  difference  in  gross welfare beneﬁts  in  moving from 
the initial (0) to the ﬁnal (1) state.27 For an example of    valuing 
“product innovations” using this ECV metric, see Trajtenberg's28 
work on computed axial tomography scanners. In this paper, 
“product innovation” refers to different modes of drug adminis- 
tration e and our ECV estimates provide a single-period monetary 
value of what might be considered “intangible beneﬁts” of giving end-
users what they want in terms of the mode of drug delivery. The 
intertemporal ﬂows of beneﬁts are not considered: ECV esti- mates 
are not expressed in discounted present values. Classical conﬁdence 





Table 4 above shows the results from our analyses. Based on the 
log-likelihoods and AIC, the LCMNL model with two classes offers 
the best ﬁt to our choice data. Further support for the LCMNL model 
is provided by similarity with results for the MMNL model. That 
said the HMNL and EMNL models provide additional insights as to 
sumptions about their distributions. In fact, the LCMNL model we 
estimated captures correlations between preference  coefﬁcients 
that vary across respondents whilst in the MMNL model, these 
correlations are constant across respondents unless one links pa- 
rameters of the continuous mixture distribution to the Z variables. 
Focusing on the LCMNL model, we observed that latent-class 
membership is dictated by whether respondents cater  to  inpa- 
tient healthcare demands: the variable INPATIENTS was the only 
statistically signiﬁcant predictor of latent-class membership. 
Gender, age (a proxy for years of experience), institutional type and 
US census region all had no statistically signiﬁcant effect on class 
membership. Conditional on membership of latent-class 1, the 
average or representative respondent was indifferent to the choice 
between intravenous and needle-free modes of drug administra- 
tion. (Holding all else equal, the coefﬁcient for the INTRAVENOUS 
variable was not statistically signiﬁcant.) The results suggested a 
positive preference for subcutaneous modes of drug administration 
and a negative preference for intramuscular drug delivery e   albeit 
the latter is only statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. 
The investigators observed a negative preference for drug de- 
livery modes that involve high dosing frequency although the 
magnitude of this effect is small. Note also the positive preference 
for self-administration by patients in non-clinical settings. On    the 
C*  is  op similar to that of the MNL model whilst a Lagrangian Multiplier test
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Dependent variable: CHOICE PROBABILITY 
 
Variables/Coefﬁcients: MNL model HMNL model EMNL model MMNL model LCMNL model 
 
   bðSEÞ 




INTRAVENOUS 0.261 (0.291) 0.146 (0.217) 0.129 (0.151) 0.149 (0.351) 0
b































NONCLINICAL_SUPV -0.097 (0.050)! -0.059 (0.039) -0.043 (0.045) -0.127 (0.056)
* 
-0.060 (0.063) -0.439 (0.170)
**
 
NONCOMP_MODERATE -0.070 (0.050) -0.044 (0.039) -0.021 (0.037) -0.143 (0.064)
* 



















-0.145 (0.155) -0.445 (0.046)
*** 

























e e (3.748, -3.781) e e 
a (PRIVATE-FOR-PROFIT) e 0.210 (0.098)
* 
e e e b0 
** 
a (NON-FOR-PROFIT) e 0.269 (0.100) 
a2(INPATIENTS) e -0.191 (0.092)
*
 
e e e 
e e e 
a3(MA) e 0.254 (0.125)
* 
e e e 
pc e e e e 0.72 0.28 





-1746.731 -1446.647 -1446.647 -1446.647 
LL
b 
-1446.647 -1416.264 -1445.726y -1399.013 -1325.1643 
AIC 2917.293 2888.527 2919.453 2852.026 2732.328 
Notes: SE ¼ standard error. For the HMNL and LCMNL models, we report selected results of the effects of respondent-characteristics on the scale-parameter and latent-class 
membership. MA ¼ Middle-Atlantic census region. MMNL model was estimated using 500 Halton draws of correlated normally-distributed coefﬁcients for the variables: 
INTRAVENOUS, INTRAMUSCULAR, NONCOMP_MODERATE and RME_MODERATE; and a log-normal distributed price coefﬁcient. ***p < 0.001 **p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 ! p < 0.10. 
LL
0 
is the initial log-likelihood and LL
b 
is the log-likelihood at ﬁnal iteration. yChi-square test for the log-likelihood ratio versus the MNL model as the null failed to reach 
statistical signiﬁcance (p vale ¼ 0.3984). AIC ¼ Akaike Information Criterion. 
 
 
other hand, the average respondent was indifferent to drug 
administration in non-clinical settings under the supervision of a 
qualiﬁed healthcare professional. This offers further support to the 
notion that if administering a drug in a non-clinical setting requires 
supervision by a qualiﬁed healthcare professional, then one might be 
better off administering that drug in a clinical setting. The average 
respondent was willing to accommodate drug delivery methods that 
are associated with a “moderate” risk of treatment non-compliance 
(in that the coefﬁcient for the variable for mod- erate risk of 
treatment non-compliance was not statistically sig- niﬁcant) but 
exhibited a negative preference for drug delivery modes that carry a 
“severe” risk of patient non-compliance. That  we observed a negative 
preference for even “moderate” risks of medication errors possibly 
reﬂects concerns about patient safety, professional reputation and 
medical malpractice suits. Although it is not statistically signiﬁcant, 
we observed a negative preference for severe risk of medication  
errors. 
The results for latent-class 2 differ in the following ways. The 
variables SUBCUTANEOUS, INTRAMUSCULAR and DOSFREQ all 
have statistically insigniﬁcant effects. The variable for severe risk of 
treatment non-compliance also had no statistically signiﬁcant ef- 
fects. We observed, however, a statistically signiﬁcant negative 
preference for drug administration in non-clinical settings under the 
supervision of a qualiﬁed healthcare professional. The results 
indicate a positive (less risk-averse) preference for modes of drug 
delivery that are associated with “moderate” risk of medication 
errors but a signiﬁcant negative preference for those that carry a 
“severe” risk of  medication errors. 
It is worth mentioning that the MNL model is equivalent to an 
LCMNL model with one homogenous latent class. Hence, given our 
LCMNL  model  with  two  classes  show  there  is  an  over       70% 
probability of a respondent belonging to latent-class 1, we should 
expect close similarity between the MNL and LCMNL models. 
Indeed, the BIC for the MNL model (2995.595) is slightly lower than 
that for the LCMNL model (2999.467) e although the latter offers a 
substantial improvement in the log-likelihoods. Given the statisti- 
cally insigniﬁcant unobserved heterogeneity identiﬁed by the 
HMNL and EMNL models, we can say this choice dataset is one 
instance where estimating an MNL model without consideration of 
alternative models might not lead to grossly misleading 
conclusions. 
Table 5 shows MWTP estimates for the non-cost attributes 
studied and the associated 95% conﬁdence intervals. As expected, we 
observe differences in the sign and magnitude of MWTP from the 
different models. Focusing on the LCMNL model, these ﬁgures 
indicate a high MWTP for intravenous and subcutaneous modes of 
drug delivery compared to needle-free routes of drug administra- tion 
e plus a high MWTP to avoid intramuscular modes of drug 
administration. Observe also the high MWTP for self- 
administration in non-clinical settings and a high MWTP to avoid 
drug delivery modes that are associated with a “severe” risk of 
treatment non-compliance and/or “severe” risk  of  medication errors. 
Next evaluated is the welfare change from reverse engineering a 
given formulation of drug C to a more patient-friendly version D. If 
we assume that both versions of the drug have the same molecule, 
efﬁcacy and safety proﬁle. Drug C is manufactured for intravenous 
administration in clinical settings, and this mode of drug delivery is 
associated with “severe” risk of treatment non-compliance and 
“severe” risk of medication errors. Drug D is manufactured for 
subcutaneous self-administration in non-clinical settings and this 
mode   of   drug   delivery   is   associated   with   “moderate”  risk of 















Marginal willingness-to-pay estimates (in $1000). 
Variables: MNL model HMNL model EMNL model MMNL model LCMNL model 
     
MdWTPð95% CIÞ MdWTP  ð95% CIÞ MdWTPð95% CIÞ MdWTPð95% CIÞ MdWTPð95% CIÞ 

































DOSFREQ -0.049 (-0.051, -0.048)
a      
-0.051 (-0.053, -0.05)
a      
-0.051 (-0.052, -0.049)
a      
-0.048 (-0.050, -0.047)




NONCLINICAL_SELF 7.82 (7.59, 8.04) 7.80 (7.61, 8.00) 9.02 (8.60, 9.44) 9.08 (8.88, 9.29) 8.21 (7.66, 8.77) 







































-0.16 (-0.47, 0.15) 











Notes: The 95% CIs above are “standard or classical conﬁdence intervals” calculated using 100 bootstrapped replicates of MWTP. This is because accurate, less-erratic and 
reliable “bootstrap conﬁdence intervals” require replications in the order of 1000, which would have been computationally demanding and time consuming.32 The conﬁdence 
intervals reported are therefore not exact. a Indicates the conﬁdence interval does not include zero. For the EMNL model, this is the result of generating a sampling distribution of MWTP; it remains that, although the 




treatment non-compliance and “moderate” risk of medication er- 
rors. Based on the MNL model, switching from drug C to D yields an 
ECV (per patient per single full treatment course over a year) of 
-$22,790 (95% CI: -$23,562 to -$22,018). Based on the MMNL 
model, the ECV is -$31,601 (95% CI: -$32,374 to -$30,828).1 Based on 
the LCMNL model with two latent classes, and unconditional on 
class membership, ECV is -$24,932 (95% CI: -$26,653 to -$23,212). 
Note that the negative sign before the ECV estimates simply 
reﬂects Equation (7); ECV is a measure of welfare gain, not a loss in 
beneﬁts. 
Fig. 1 shows the kernel density plots of the distribution of ECV 
derived from the MNL, MMNL and LCMNL models. Notice, the 
considerable overlap of the plots for the models; in particular the 
closer overlap between the kernel density plots for the LCMNL and 
MNL models. This provides some reassurance as to the accuracy of 
the welfare estimates obtained. The difference between the plots 
for the LCMNL and MMNL models probably reﬂects the different 
assumptions about preference heterogeneity. We believe that the 
reason why we see a wider spread of the kernel density plot of ECV 
derived from the LCMNL model (relative to the MNL or MMNL 
models) is: because the LCMNL estimates are based on the average 
coefﬁcients over the two-latent classes (with weights given by the 
probability of latent-class membership). Hence, if the probabilities 
of class-membership do not remain constant or ﬁxed for each of the 
100 bootstrap resamples, one would obtain a lot more variation in 
ECV than if (fortuitously) the proportion of individuals belonging to 
each of the latent classes does not vary from one bootstrap 




A retransformation problem that plagues estimation of MMNL models with log- 
normal coefﬁcients. The cost coefﬁcient reported in Table    4 for the MMNL model 
(bp Þ was derived  from  the  distribution  of  its  logged  form,  lnðbp Þ,  using  the following 
retransformation: bp ¼ expðlnðbp Þþ 0:5SD
2
Þ where SD ¼ standard  de-  viation for lnðbp 
Þ:  This, however, assumes the individual lnðbp Þ recovered from the 
dataset are normally-distributed with a constant variance. If this is not the case, one 
obtains a biased and less consistent retransformed cost coefﬁcient. Whilst the 
retransformed cost coefﬁcient may bracket that obtained MMNL models with ﬁxed 
or normally-distributed cost coefﬁcients, this may introduce signiﬁcant differences 
in subsequent welfare analysis. Here in computing the welfare change of switching 
from option C to D, we used the cost coefﬁcient (bp ¼ 0.000066) from an unre- 
ported MMNL model (with a lower log-likelihood ¼ -1427.922 and speciﬁed with a 
normally-distributed cost coefﬁcient) as this ﬁgure is comparable with cost co- 
efﬁcients from the other models. We consider this a reasonable solution to the 
retransformation problem as the other non-cost coefﬁcients from the unreported 
MMNL model are similar to the MMNL model reported in Table 4. The problem is 
obviously situation speciﬁc and we suggest further discussions and research on how 
best to resolve  it. 
more with that of the LCMNL model conﬁrms that, for this dataset, 




The ECV estimates, which provide a monetary value of the 
welfare gain from making patient-friendly medicines (1) are in the 
same order of magnitude as the annual acquisition costs ($17,017  to 
$41,888) for some biologic drugs 29; and (2) exceed the annual 
direct monetary costs of administering most drugs (for a single full 
treatment course). They are likely to fall in the “high end” of the 
distribution  of  the  direct  monetary  costs  of  drug administration 
reported elsewhere.17 
The results above suggest a strong positive preference for modes 
of drug administration that are associated with some but not sig- 
niﬁcant risks of treatment non-compliance and/or medication er- 
rors. Relative to needle-free routes, there is either a positive 
preference or indifference to intravenous and subcutaneous drug 
delivery; plus a somewhat negative preference for or indifference    to 
intramuscular modes of administration. The results also show a 
consistent preference for self-administration of drugs in non- clinical 
settings e and a consistent negative preference for drug 
administration in clinical settings or non-clinical settings under the 
supervision of a qualiﬁed healthcare professional. For this reason, 
we will encourage advances in pharmaceutical manufacturing such 
as “closed vial access devices” or “closed-system transfer devices” 
that allows healthcare professionals to safely reconstitute and 
administer what might be considered hazardous   drugs. 
Granted, it might be argued that the sign and magnitude of 
MWTP from the LCMNL model for the INTRAVENOUS and SUB- 
CUTANEOUS variables is counterintuitive as one would expect a 
positive preference for less-invasive needle-free routes. However, 
there are sound clinical reasons for a positive MWTP for intrave- 
nous and subcutaneous delivery, relative to needle-free routes  (even 
if the effect is not always statistically signiﬁcant). Not all drugs, 
especially in emergency situations, can be given via needle- free 
routes; and the pharmacokinetic proﬁle of some drugs (for example, 
those that have a narrow therapeutic index) may be such that 
intravenous administration is the only or most appropriate route of 
drug delivery. Considering also the variable for re- spondents who 
cater for inpatient populations is the only statisti- cally signiﬁcant 
predictor of latent-class membership (institutional context and all 
other Z variables in Table 3 had no statistically signiﬁcant effects on 
latent-class membership), the positive co- efﬁcients for the 







Fig. 1.  Sample distribution of expected compensating variation estimates. 
not as surprising as it ﬁrst seems. In fact, this is consistent with a 
DCE of French physicians' preferences for intravenous and oral 
cancer chemotherapy that showed a positive preference for intra- 
venous administration in curative settings as opposed to a positive 
preference  for oral (needle-free)  administration  in palliative   non- 
curative settings.10 
Further, it might be argued that MWTP and ECV derived from 
the LCMNL model suffers from ecological fallacy e as they are based 
on the average weighted coefﬁcients over two latent-classes. For that 
matter (erroneous) conclusions that apply at the aggregate level may 
not apply at the latent-class level. However, we do not know a priori 
which latent-class a given respondent belongs to e  and we cannot 
assume ﬁxed class membership. Hence the esti- mates reported here, 
which are unconditional on class member- ship, are a valid measure 
of welfare  beneﬁts. 
Notwithstanding, a number of limitations apply here. First, in an 
attempt to capture the global nature of the pharmaceutical in- 
dustry, this research only evaluated the preferences of US health- 
care professionals at a given point in time. Some sort of temporal 
averaging of stated choices across independently drawn sample 
populations at different time points may help reduce any time- 
dependent measurement noise that casts doubts about  the  external 
validity of the ﬁndings reported here. That said, the gen- eral 
question of whether preferences for modes of drug adminis- tration 
differ from country to country is an empirical matter that requires 
an extensive multicountry DCE beyond that presented in this paper. 
Second, the hypothetical choice scenarios presented to US 
healthcare professionals required that they act as fund-holders 
taking on payer responsibilities. It might then be argued that the 
choice data collected may be different from what    might have been 
elicited from actual healthcare payers (who are also agents acting on 
behalf of patients). On the other hand, payers in their managerial 
accounting roles rarely administer drugs to patients themselves: 
they are less familiar with the day-to-day clinical needs of patients. 
Also, payers are more likely to concern themselves with the direct 
costs and direct health beneﬁts a drug offers rather than the at- 
tributes of drug administration and the associated intangible ben- 
eﬁts. On balance, asking healthcare professionals to make discrete 
drug choices assuming they had ﬁnancial control of healthcare 
resources is a better approach compared to a sample population of 
payers e not to mention the practical problems of identifying such   a 
sample. Note, however, that the choice data collected was not in a 
form that allows subgroup analyses of the preferences of doctors  and 
nurses. That the preferences of doctors differ from that of nurses 
might be worth pursuing in a future DCE study designed to 
investigate this issue. Related to this is the observation that 
imperfect agency means the choices of healthcare  professionals  may 
not necessarily match what patients want or prefer. The DCE 
results, however, do not require healthcare professionals to act as 
perfect agents on behalf of patients. The negative coefﬁcients for  the 
attributes “severe risk of medication errors” and “severe risk of 
treatment compliance” indicates that although healthcare pro- 
fessionals may be risk-averse and focus on their own utility, pa- 
tients' well-being are not ignored. Patients, especially less-  informed 
passive ones,  indirectly obtain the  gross welfare bene-  ﬁts measured 
in this paper via the decisions and actions taken by healthcare 
professionals on their  behalf. 
Third is the possibility that using categorical variables for the 
cost attribute may lead to different results or, at least, reveal non- 
linearities in the price elasticity of “demands” for the non-  monetary  
attributes  studied.  For  the  choice  dataset,     however, 
 
even if such non-linearities exits, the near-zero coefﬁcients for the 
cost attribute is such that this is unlikely to signiﬁcantly change the 
arguments  and  conclusions reached. 
Bar these limitations, it is clear that the gross (supposedly 
intangible) welfare beneﬁts gained from patient-friendly modes of 
drug administration are not trivial. Payers, providers and other 
agents in healthcare markets therefore need to recognize not just 
the value of the drug molecule (i.e., the net health beneﬁts it offers) 
but also value of the drug delivery mode or method. But there is 
evidence that the mode of drug delivery could also improve health 
outcomes, i.e., amplify the magnitude of direct health beneﬁts 
derived from the drug molecule or perhaps reduce the uncertainty 
around real-life experience of these health beneﬁts. Delea et al.,30 
for instance, show that changing drug delivery systems may not only 
reduce the monetary costs of drug administration but also confer 
health beneﬁts expressed in terms of quality-adjusted life- years 
(QALYs) to patients. These potential increments in QALYs 
(measuring direct health beneﬁts) are separate from the ECV esti- 
mates that measure indirect end-user   beneﬁts. 
Admittedly, on the supply-side, the expected additional reve- 
nues net of manufacturing costs (private producer surplus) and the 
state of manufacturing and formulation science must be adequate 
and capable enough to support the desired innovations and efforts to 
make patient-friendly medicines. The value created via product 
differentiation will then depend on whether a manufacturer is able 
to reorganize its technical capabilities to pursue a successful “cost 
strategy”, i.e., reducing manufacturing costs over time; or a suc- 
cessful “beneﬁts strategy”, i.e., increasing value through larger in- 
creases in gross end-user beneﬁts; or both.31 The point here is: if 
the discounted present value of private producer surplus of such 
value-creation initiatives (relative to other investment opportu- 
nities) is positive, then there is no reason why manufacturers 
should not consider the switch from drug option C to D. The 
incentive for a manufacturer to develop patient-friendly drug de- 
livery systems, however, exists only if healthcare payers/providers 
are willing to pay for the value of the drug delivery mode, i.e., they 
are willing to channel prescribing and consumption choices (shift 
market shares) towards products with the preferred attributes of 
drug administration. In which case, effective and efﬁcient use of 
pharmaceutical manufacturing research resources will require, at 
least, knowledge of what attributes end-users want most and what 
combination of attributes offer the maximum possible (change in) 
welfare beneﬁts, which in turn will offer the largest (change in) 





This study found a non-trivial marginal willingness-to-pay for 
drug delivery systems that are associated with zero or moderate risk 
of medication errors and/or treatment non-compliance. It also found 
a high marginal willingness-to-pay for self-administration of drugs 
in non-clinical settings. In addition, it was estimated that the 
monetary value of making patient-friendly medicines is as large as 
the annual acquisition costs of some biologic drugs and/or are likely 
to fall in the “high-end” of the distribution of the direct monetary 
costs of drug administration. The discrete choice experiment pro- 
vides additional insights as to what biopharmaceutical manufac- 
turers should pay attention to in making patient-friendly medicines. 
An examination of end-user preferences should help manufacturers 
make more effective and efﬁcient use of limited resources for 
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